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Abstract 
This study defines an aspect of consultant knowledge that provides credibility without claiming unrealistic status 
for a field like consulting. Our focus is the "sector knowledge" that consultants accumulate which derives from 
repeated assignments in the industrial sector in which the client organization resides. This has been under-
researched partly because of an emphasis oil knowledge as technique and method. But knowledge configured 
around the sector enables consultants to play the role of the outside expert and draw oil a language and 
experiences held in common with the client. The paper explores the role of consultants as sector intermediaries 
through a case study of contemporary management consulting in a UK local authority. We see "the sector" as air 
alternative type of knowledge formation salient for a client-centered occupation like consulting. We also explore 
sector knowledge as a negotiated setting and dispel overly simple notions of know-how being "brought to" the 
client. 
 
Introduction 
The kinds of knowledge that management consultants and the consulting industry employ are not easily defined. 
Client firms can ‘‘consult’’ over a range of activities and problems, potentially drawing on different kinds of 
knowledge, while the complexity of consulting as a cluster of occupations has led to some very different images 
of skills. Consulting itself is in no sense circumscribed like some technical or professional occupations. However, 
considered as a part of the huge professional and business services industry, it has been grouped with categories 
of expertise that are seen as having only ‘‘weak knowledge’’ and an ambivalent place in the spectrum of expert 
labor (Alvesson, 1993; Reed, 1996). The implicit reference point for these knowledge forms obviously is the 
knowledge associated with codified or theoretical forms (‘‘strong knowledge’’). Hence there is an implied 
contrast with knowledge-as-theory or a body of communicable principles traditionally associated with expert 
labor such as the professions and scientific/technical occupations (Robertson & Swan, 1998). 
But such divisions are perhaps rather crudely drawn and leave little room for formations that fall ‘‘in between’’ 
the strictly objective and subjective. While a corpus of abstract theoretical knowledge might be the defining 
feature of some professional groups, it may be less relevant for others who have to have knowledge of precedent 
and client preferences, as well as theoretical knowledge. For management consultants knowledge is accepted as 
being more client-centered (Fincham, 1999). But is this knowledge unique to consultants? Do not all suppliers of 
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services have to know their clients? Conversely, many consultant solutions will have an abstract side, even though 
they have to address the vagaries of the management task. Consultant activities like change management, for 
instance, are based on process theories that inform countless models and frameworks (Schein, 1988; Argyris, 
1990). 
Amid this confusing variety one lasting way of defining the consultant is that of the outside expert. The image of 
the ‘‘outsider’’ is potent and dramatic, and lends weight to claims of supplying something the insider cannot. 
Consultants have frequently been seen as marginal figures who gain influence by a degree of otherness and sheer 
difference (e.g., Antal & Krebsbach-Gnath, 2001; Anand, Glick, & Manz, 2002). Competence and credibility are 
derived from outside the managerial jurisdiction, but ‘‘outside expertise’’ has rarely been defined (cf. Menon & 
Pfeffer, 2003). What exactly is outside the client organization that the consultant is expert in? The argument of 
this paper is that an important element of consultant knowledge is formed around industry sectors. Consultants are 
here viewed as ‘‘sector specialists’’ who accumulate knowledge of industrial sectors through repeated 
assignments with similar client firms. Up to now this view has been under-researched and not appreciated as 
important perhaps because of tendencies to polarize subjective and objective forms of knowledge. 
Consultants construct their appeal to the client by claiming various kinds of special knowledge (Kitay & Wright, 
2003; Werr & Stjernberg, 2003). This may involve mastery of some technique or fashionable framework, 
familiarity with new equipment or hardware, or the esoteric skills of divining clients’ problems—but also these 
claims are frequently backed by experience of problems and solutions bedded in a particular industry or sector 
grouping. The sector specialist claims to bring improved judgement and comparison with other sector players 
(benchmarking). Industry surveys suggest that managements are highly sensitized to this kind of information 
(Clark, 1995: 70). The industrial sector in which the client firm operates is a source of information about rivals, 
similar technologies and vital networks, and an intermediary who brings news of the sector is a crucial figure. 
Demand for sector knowledge may stem from clients who are familiar with standard fads and want more relevant 
know-how. 
We propose to explore the sector concept in terms of the construction of expert knowledge and of the sector itself 
as an institutional space. The first focuses on how consultants develop this form of knowledge and how they 
solidify it to support claims to legitimacy. Here the professions literature helps in suggesting how expert 
knowledge translates into action. A number of theories reflect the decomposition of expert labor into different 
levels of activity that span the claims to identify problems and apply solutions—in particular Abbott’s (1988) and 
Carlile’s (2002) modes and stages of expert knowledge. 
In addition, we also explore how client and consultant are involved in knowledge production. The so-called firm-
in-sector theory (e.g., Child & Smith, 1987) has related the strategic development of firms with the dynamics of 
the industry sector, seeing managerial action not as simply constrained by pressures from sector competitors but 
as being complexly negotiated with external networks. Such an approach suggests that the ‘‘simple model’’ of the 
consultant as the outsider, who brings privileged knowledge in, needs greater nuance. Management consultants 
may be well placed to acquire this knowledge, but the boundaries are not rigid and clients as ‘‘insiders’’ will also 
have ‘‘outside’’ knowledge of their markets and industry sectors. Hence ‘‘sector knowledge’’ needs to be 
conceived as a distinctive construct where client managers and outside experts interact. 
The paper explores these aspects of consultants’ role as sector intermediaries through an example of 
contemporary management consulting in a large UK local authority. This provided a significant context for 
sector-based interaction. The consultants utilized their experience of local government and the public sector as a 
context for knowledge and as a way of framing their understanding of the client’s problem. The case study 
organization was embedded in a range of sector networks and contacts, while the central ‘‘story’’ of the case 
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involved managerial dilemmas in which sector knowledge was clearly being mobilized. Before looking at this 
material, a framework for how expert knowledge in this area might be legitimized is developed. 
 
Consultant Knowledge and Sector Knowledge 
Claiming legitimacy in a world continually reconfiguring around new media and technologies is problematic 
(Benders & van Veen, 2001). Indeed, where knowledge is ambiguous and transient, few would actually want to 
claim lasting stability. What would be the point in becoming qualified, say, in Business Process Re-engineering 
when that particular fad is going to decline and disappear in a few short years (Carson, Lanier, Carson, &Guidry, 
2000)? Nevertheless, bodies of knowledge with no well-defined abstract forms do trade off these fast-moving 
fields. 
Recent studies of weak-knowledge occupations have stressed certain kinds of less structured knowledge 
formations defined in relation to available sources of status. One very close to that of sector knowledge (and, 
indeed, which may be regarded as simply another expression of knowing the sector) is the knowledge 
accumulated around the client. In certain respects, a curious kind of contradictory relationship to the client as a 
kind of opposing ‘‘other’’ can be used to build expert claims. For example, Pieczka’s (2002) research on public 
relations and Alvesson’s (1994) study of advertising show how credibility is sought through knowledge that 
differentiates the expert from the client. The occupation as a whole claims some special judgement or instinct 
(whether it is the ‘‘effective message’’ in public relations or ‘‘creative input’’ in advertising) that enables it to 
formulate and solve problems, in whatever field, in way, the paying client cannot. In a sense ‘‘the client’’ is being 
constructed here as a set of predispositions and assumptions about expertise, and by playing off that, and creating 
a distance from or boundary with the client, the expert occupation defines its own niche. 
However, clients can contribute more directly to tradable knowledge. For a sector speciality to develop, 
knowledge comes through repeated assignments and extra-project contacts involving its main players and their 
technologies and networks. For consultants, the sum total of interaction over a group of related clients equates to 
this sector-based experience. Here, for example, Føsstenløkken et al. (2003) highlighted the importance of 
learning from clients in joint project teams and client interaction as a key form of knowledge development. This 
interestingly reverses common assumptions about knowledge transfer in consultancy projects being a simple flow 
from expert to client. These researchers point out that having ‘‘good clients’’ was a major factor in consultants’ 
individual development whereas other forms of learning (e.g., cognitive forms associated with the acquisition of 
abstract knowledge) were less well regarded. 
Such alternative knowledge sources and knowledge formations may have been overlooked in the past because of 
the tendency to present knowledge in particular ways. Literature in this area, particularly on the professions (e.g., 
Friedson, 1986; Abbott, 1988) has typically had twin preoccupations. First that of abstract knowledge, the 
importance of which as a basis of occupational power cannot be overstated. There is of course a gamut of 
historical, political, and institutional factors that account for the occupational ascendancy of professions. But an 
abstract knowledge base at a fundamental level is what enables professionals to argue for elite status and 
exclusive jurisdiction (Wilensky, 1964: p. 144; Strang & Meyer, 1993), whilst ‘‘abstracting ability’’ (Abbott, 
1988: p. 30) denotes the high ground of pure theory. Second there is the dualism between this knowledge and 
opposed forms of ‘‘weaker’’ knowledge reliant on the so-called esoteric skills and sensitivity to client needs. 
Once again professional ascendancy is seen to lie in the ‘‘optimum combination’’ (Wilensky, 1964: p. 149) 
between intellectual/cognitive knowledge and a set of practical capabilities. 
These models of knowledge may need adaptation for ‘‘newer’’ groups like consultancy. The first would tend to 
emphasize discipline and methods-based skills, while the second divides these from more subjective or esoteric 
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forms. Consultants use both these knowledge forms but, as a matter of emphasis, they may distract attention from 
other knowledge formations and in particular more typical and salient intermediate forms. We can refer to 
research that does develop accounts which, while they refer to ‘‘strong knowledge’’ experts, may be adapted to be 
of broader relevance. Abbott (1988) has very usefully broken down the modes of knowledge of powerful 
professions engaged in client-centered work, and we can consider his framework in the analysis of consultants’ 
sector knowledge (Table 1). 
The framework Abbott (1988: p. 40) provides is concerned with how expert claims are legitimized in the 
accomplishment of work. Professional work is decomposed into a sequence of diagnosis, inference, and treatment 
in which experts link back to their theoretical knowledge, and forward to solutions. This process defines different 
modes of expert labor, or what Abbott calls the ‘‘three acts of professional practice’’ (p. 36). The first, diagnosis, 
takes the problem into the expert knowledge system and is about ‘‘structuring’’ the problem in ways that align 
with existing knowledge. In diagnosis a ‘‘picture’’ of the client (and their problem) is formed and referred to a set 
of professionally legitimate problems. Actually dealing with client problems occurs in the final treatment phase. 
Here further aspects of legitimation occur, notably the control of categories of treatment and brokering kinds of 
treatment with the client. In between, inference is where the treatment strategy is worked out; in routine cases 
there is effectively no stage of inference because a simple diagnosis almost automatically produces a solution, but 
for more non-routine problems the ‘‘middle game’’ of expert thought is conducted. 
This model, largely conceived in terms of the professions, points out a number of areas where knowledge 
legitimacy is problematic. In the middle stage, for example, there must be neither too little nor too much inference 
(Abbott, 1988: p. 52). Too little inference means too comprehensive a set of rules and then professional work 
becomes vulnerable to routinization; too much interpretation and the knowledge base of the expert cadre comes 
dangerously close to common sense and again may be challenged. In addition, professional ‘‘treatment’’ (akin to 
the consultant solution) confers control if imposed on its own terms, but there are always tensions and limits 
(Abbott, 1988: p. 47). The expert occupation lays itself open to rivals who are more willing to tailor and 
customize solutions, so that solutions shuttle between expert diagnosis and client-specific tensions. Considering 
this framework in relation to other types of expert labor, problem areas may be more acute, in particular for 
groups like management consultants that have relatively powerful organizational clients and less well-established 
knowledge bases. 
Establishing contact and rapport with the client occupies much consulting effort (Sturdy, Schwarz, & Spicer, 
2006). In this context, the analysis provided by Carlile (2002) is useful; he refers to another type of expert labor 
namely technical design groups engaged in product innovation. These expert workers are different from a group 
like management consultants, but they do require integration and surmounting the difficulties of expert talking to 
expert is a core problem. Carlile develops a sequence, also over three phases, that is not identical to Abbott’s but 
is strikingly similar. His interest in the integration between innovating groups (a process which like knowledge 
legitimation results in a practical solution) is seen to proceed from a shared language that parties can familiarize 
themselves with and so communicate at base level. Next, opportunities for parties to learn about each others’ 
concerns and for mutual sympathies to develop need to occur. And finally actual practices need to be engaged in 
and a context developed in which knowledge transformation may happen. This framework reflects three levels—
syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic—that traverse from basic necessary conditions to conditions sufficient for 
integration. The final phase is particularly important as it contains ‘‘new knowledge’’ untainted by previous 
interests and conflicts. Carlile (2002: 445–446) suggests that collaboration is often clinched as people identify or 
create new knowledge. 
Insights from combining these influential frameworks are particularly illuminating. While Abbott is concerned 
with the process of legitimizing knowledge (which is crucial for consulting), he is less interested in problems of 
integration with client groups (as powerful professional groups typically enjoy occupational control in these 
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areas). However, Carlile’s analysis can supply added pointers as to how the client-consultant relationship might 
work, though it is less concerned with legitimation of knowledge (because effectively this is expert talking to 
expert). 
Taking this analysis across to the legitimation of consultant knowledge (see Table 1) there is first the initial phase 
of problem diagnosis. The expert needs to claim an understanding of the client’s problem and relate this to 
solutions. But experts who share knowledge with often powerful clients cannot monopolize the diagnosis. Instead 
experience of the client’s sector provides a shared industry language and common reference points and a context 
for claims of being able to diagnose problems. Then, in the middle phase, the opportunity for the parties to adjust 
disparate beliefs and values (‘‘semantic’’ understanding) is similar to the notion of non-routine work on problems 
being carried out, and clients and consultants working towards common positions. Such a process of joint learning 
is aided by exploring understandings of actors and activities in the sector. Final consolidation occurs if consultants 
identify practical solutions that appeal to clients and that are referenced by recipes from the sector. 
Table 1. Expert knowledge and sector knowledge 
 
 
Data Collection and Case Study 
Our case involved a specific consulting project studied between March 2004 and May 2005. Observation and 
interviews were used in the collection of direct and reported data, and perceptions from both sides of a live client–
consultant relationship were gathered. The case study was researched in the following manner. The consultants 
were one of the Big 4 IT/consulting firms and were developing a new procurement model for buying-in agency 
staff in a large local authority in the south of England. We interviewed participants involved in the project and 
also observed project meetings between consultant and client teams. 
The project team was staffed roughly symmetrically with six people: three consultants and three client managers. 
The most senior consultant, who was an acknowledged procurement and public sector specialist, provided the 
links back to the agency; there was a senior consultant who was another specialist in procurement and oversaw 
the project on-site, and there was a junior who provided data gathering and analysis manpower (we call these 
Consultants A, B, and C). On the client side, the most senior person was a director-level council officer who was 
effectively the project sponsor; the senior council officer who headed the procurement group was another key 
member, and one of the managers in the group also attended meetings (these are Clients A, B, and C). 
For data gathering, six project meetings were attended and 11 interviews were carried out. Most of the interviews 
and meetings were taped but otherwise field notes were used. Project meetings were attended by a researcher as a 
 6 
 
 
‘‘fly on the wall’’ taking an unobtrusive seat, and recording was possible in these relatively small gatherings. 
Meetings and interviews lasted 60–90 minute, and three of the more central participants (Clients A and B and 
Consultant A) were re-interviewed several times. For analysis, we sought categories related to the main consulting 
task (seeking new forms of procurement to gain efficiencies in buying in contract labor) and searched in the data 
for insights and sequences showing how respondents brought sector information to bear on this problem. 
The consultants were investigating the supplier interface to the agencies from which temporary staff were 
employed. The project was part of a larger ‘‘e.government’’ agenda. Driven from central government (the source 
of most change in local government) this focused on a number of areas of which procurement was a prominent 
one. In the specific project we studied there were no direct links to the labor supplying agencies, as the 
consultants worked on internally held data about contracts and payments. However, what we might think of as the 
regular inhabitants of an industrial sector, namely the peer group of organizations similar to the client 
organization, were invoked to help internal decisions. Achieving efficiencies in procurement basically meant that 
a single set of bureaucratic rules had to accommodate some very different purchasing decisions and markets of 
supply (potentially from garbage collection all the way to professional areas like civic planning and surveying). 
How other councils had tackled these problems—the vendor models they were adopting, the preferential deals 
they were obtaining—was regarded as important information. 
 
Legitimizing Sector Knowledge 
Sector knowledge is developed partly via structural arrangements within consulting firms; it is ‘‘extracted’’ and 
formalized from client interaction and constructed as collective knowledge back inside the firm. Consultants are 
groomed within an industry or sector before moving on to other experience, and within firms (particularly large 
ones) there are arrangements of ‘‘industry lines’’ that overlap discipline-based and functional groupings. 
Capitalizing sector knowledge also occurred by individuals deliberately targeting this knowledge. Beyond the 
obvious point that consultants see clients operating in a sector and that knowing about this is important, they 
organize their careers and occupational identities around this knowledge. Especially in the diagnosis phase, sector 
knowledge was most clearly ‘‘on display’’ and used to embed other knowledge. 
 
Diagnosis 
Sector know-how was used in the diagnosis phase to claim a deep understanding of how local government was 
modernizing and e.procurement evolving. The senior consultant (Consultant A) in particular had worked with the 
council and several others for many years, and his role as client-relations manager, attending project meetings but 
‘‘not implementing,’’ encouraged an encompassing vision. He had a complete narrative of how they had guided 
the natural history of changes. Through his firm’s involvement in the sector (‘‘50 consultants working in local 
government at any moment of time’’) they had actually helped to form the ‘‘simplification of what is really 
important and what really needs to be focused on.’’ They were able to deliver the kind of model that would 
‘‘embed the discipline around the selected suppliers’’ and make ‘‘the buying process easier and more 
disciplined.’’ However, the so-called professional diagnosis tends to take the problem away from the client, and 
consultants cannot risk being seen as outsiders talking an alien jargon (Kieser, 2002a). A situation in which they 
and the client speak different languages must be avoided. So the consultant has to face both ways; as well as 
fighting for the legitimation of knowledge (in the powerful professions built by abstracting the knowledge base) 
exclusivity must be balanced with understanding. 
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Industry terminology and vocabulary were not hidden but continually on display. The procurement models of 
local government reflected the unique nature of authorities as spending institutions while a set of distinctive 
concerns involved the contracts with vendors of temporary labor, the detail of councils’ labor markets, spend and 
budgets, and so on. This insider language of authorities was thus based on industry/sector knowledge, and for the 
experts to converse convincingly with clients they had to have learned about the mass of detailed knowledge 
familiar to insiders. This requirement of a common model of understanding and knowing the sector gave 
consultants a language in common with clients within which diagnosis was embedded. 
What we’ve actually done over the past 18 months is created a model for local government that fits in 
with the national e.procurement project. So we have a local government-focused—a local government 
specific—procurement model. And then we’ve reviewed quite a number of categories of spend already 
with other boroughs. I don’t know maybe 10, 15 something like that. So we’ve got those as references to 
bring in.We’ve then reviewed spend with a whole bunch of primary care trusts as well. So for social 
services there’s direct correlation with the same categories but from the health side rather than social 
services side. So there’s that which can be brought in as well. So it’s a bit more than just a generic model. 
And actually I would argue now that the value that we bring is around the fact that we’ve made it local 
government specific. And we’ve got people whom we can bring in and who have got the local 
government knowledge, rather than just, you know, it’s a generic model. The power within the team—
there probably will be one or two who don’t have local government knowledge but maybe have health 
knowledge, or something else—because cross-learning needs to happen all the time. And clearly they will 
be reliant on the model. (Consultant A) 
We note later these legitimacy claims do not go uncontested. Nevertheless, overall the sector was important, in 
the basic stages of legitimizing knowledge, for asserting a kind of professionally exclusive diagnosis and for 
expert knowledge that reconciled clients and their problems with a knowledge base. Client managers accepted that 
aspects of the ‘‘business case’’ were orchestrated throughout the project by consultants’ input. 
Yeah, that’s what they were brought in for, so I think we did learn stuff from that. Certainly there’s the 
peripheral stuff around the access to information which they provide which you wouldn’t be able to 
gather easily from other sources. So a benchmark of information and data around costs and prices. . . but 
they have an easier access to that from other commissions and other contacts. (Client B) 
We see that sector knowledge did not operate in a vaccum with respect to other forms of knowledge. Abstract 
knowledge in the form of the professional field of procurement was used by consultants, but at the same time the 
setting out of a common industry model also stressed the importance of local over generic knowledge. It united 
the common language of internal and external expert groups, and provided the ‘‘shared and stable syntax’’ 
(Carlile, 2002: p. 443) that must exist if basic information processing is to go ahead. 
 
Inference 
These considerations of language and diagnosis affect how we view the client–consultant couple. Ostensibly the 
relationship is a collaborative one. Consultants as paid helpers serve their own interests by doing the best possible 
job for the client. Yet beyond this basic truth even mainstream literature on consulting recognizes conflict. 
Consultants are brought in to stimulate change yet their very presence may be resented and imply that insiders 
have failed (e.g., Schein, 1988; Argyris, 1990). There may be even deeper seated conflict—conflicts around 
deeper value systems that create differences at levels of meaning and sub-culture. So innovative relations require 
wider sympathies; groups need to specify what their difficulties and priorities are (Carlile, 2002: p. 452). The 
sector here serves as a space for carrying out processes of inference and integration. 
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In the ‘‘middle game’’ of bridging the distance between client and consultant, such a knowledge construct can be 
‘‘brought into’’ the organization discursively so that actors have the opportunity to add what they know in a 
general synergy where ways forward can be explored. One central problem of the project was the basic 
procurement methodology they should adopt—this could involve going to a favored large main supplier, or 
several different suppliers. Each had a balance of factors around control, efficiency, and market forces. In a way 
this represented a classic management dilemma (like make vs. buy, or centralization vs. decentralization) in that 
pros and cons, and the ‘‘right’’ choice, were complex and contingent. The initial reading of the sector was that a 
dominant choice did exist in the shape of the so-called master vendor model, or the favored single supplier. 
A lot of them are keen on master vendor at the moment, understandably. Sets some extremely tight 
monetary-rewarded performance measures around some of the analysis and some of the things that you 
want to get done. So the additional premium that you’re paying is going to be paid for by the better 
performance that you get. (Consultant A) 
...it was always the plan to have a number of preferred supplier or properly negotiated contracts with all 
agencies, whether it’s your master vendor, you know, all those options. So it’s been on the cards for a 
while, it’s been an obvious efficiency-type project because all the efficiency reviews across the country in 
local government are saying, ‘‘Probably your number one saving is agency staff,’’ it’s identified as a 
common issue. (Client C) 
But while this seemed an emergent recipe, there was also the alternative ‘‘neutral vendor’’ where the contracting 
agent acts effectively as a broker, or an agency for other suppliers separately contracted to find staff. This model 
needed evaluating too. 
Consultant A 
And were there many examples of neutral vendor in the public sector? 
Client B 
There are a few and there are certainly. . . I was talking to some people from [names another authority] 
who got procurement, I think they’ve actually maybe externalized part of the procurement function. 
Client C 
There aren’t many pure neutral vendors around though. I mean, that’s the thing, isn’t it, I’m only aware of 
two able to get. . .! 
Consultant B 
The relationship at [local authority] was originally pure neutral. I don’t know if it is now or not. 
Client C 
Well even the neutrals aren’t totally neutral. [laughter] That’s the thing, actually, probably, because it’s 
sort of. . .! 
Client B 
It’s more where the neutral is in the market. There’s not many examples where they’re pure service 
providers. 
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Consultant B 
If you’re talking about examples, I’ve been talking to [names an individual]. I haven’t been able to pin 
anybody down that will confirm it yet, but I’ve been told that [local authority] have actually got a neutral 
vendor supplier established, and . . . I got that from the supplier, though, rather than from [local authority] 
so it’s somewhat open to interpretation. 
 
In this process of providing wider references and benchmarking, at least two things are going on. First, knowledge 
of the sector was itself being constituted. We may think of ‘‘sector knowledge’’ crudely as something external to 
the organization, but knowledge is imperfectly spread within project teams, and in exchanges individuals were 
being informed about the activities of particular actors and events they may have been unaware of. In evaluating 
routinized structures of the established models of vendoring, they introduced information that veered between the 
routine structures of a dominant model and alternative patterns reflecting how, in these processes, experts seek 
‘‘not too little, not too much’’ inference (Abbott, 1988: p. 51). Second, information about sector actors of a quite 
fragmentary and uncertain kind was being pooled and regarded as legitimate in an effort to explore possibilities 
and move the discussion on. 
 
Treatment 
Solutions to problems get accomplished if client views are incorporated and experts use sources in common with 
clients. Knowledge from outside, drawn into this process, can draw the consultant closer to the client. In feeling 
their way towards a distinct position participants were reacting to received models and to the anchor points and 
orientations of the sector. In the project team the feeling was that there were different models out there and 
‘‘nobody’s got it spot on at the moment.’’ One council had ‘‘really got it sussed’’ but they were smaller and their 
‘‘organization of 200 is not relevant.’’ Another was ‘‘an example of a master vendor where they’ve got better 
rates but they’ve seen no benefit in terms of actual reduction in numbers of staff.’’ Yet another had obtained 
benefits by tightening internal management, but its ‘‘big blitz’’ was not sustainable. In short, sector knowledge 
was used to restrain dominant sector recipes and to keep options open. 
Other sector actors were also introduced. Client B had been to a presentation from a legal firm specializing in 
procurement contracts, which had done work around ‘‘the things we’re looking for inclusion in contracts and how 
the neutral transaction should work.’’ Certain advantages of the model in managing suppliers that ‘‘you might fall 
out with’’ were identified. Then another council was referred to which had outsourced to an agent who used 
neutral vendoring, and the possibility was raised that their contract details could be examined which would ‘‘cut 
costs a bit.’’ One of the consultant team (Consultant B) referred to the Contracting Group which all the authorities 
in the region support, and which acted as a clearing house monitoring and reviewing local government 
procurement. The Contracting Group was believed to have ‘‘actually got a neutral vendor preferred supplier 
established’’ using the model as a framework for a whole round of procurement contracts. However, Client B then 
volunteered information that this initiative may have got stalled—which prompted inputs from several 
participants about whether anything at all was going ahead. 
Client A (half-humorously) 
It just seems like horribly, horribly confused! 
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Consultant B 
The key thing which we always talk about, because we’ve had initiatives all around all the time, is to 
focus on what’s best for yourselves. 
Client A 
Absolutely. 
Consultant B 
If there are other people who want to join you, fantastic, but let’s focus on that in the short term. 
Client C 
I mean, all the boroughs I’ve spoken to, everybody’s doing their own thing. It’s just like, if you wait for 
some big thing, it’ll never happen. 
Hence they leaned towards flexibility and had stories from the sector to support different choices. So while in one 
sense the sector might be thought to rationally transfer strategic recipes, the appeal of ‘‘ready made’’ or generic 
solutions did not seem especially strong and in our case more oppositional uses of information were going on. In 
debating the vendor model, or principle of vendoring they should adopt, back and forth, items of information were 
put together more like pieces of a jigsaw to arrive at a complete picture. The process of utilizing sector knowledge 
paved the way for a consensus to emerge around going down a pragmatic route. 
 
Constructing Sector Knowledge 
In the exchanges in project meetings information about what other sector actors were doing was clearly a 
touchstone in decision making. Sector knowledge was frequently ‘‘on display’’ and people were willing (or even 
competing) to contribute what they knew. A large amount of sheer organizational work and occupational identity-
building was in process. The experience of problems and solutions across the sector supported the process of 
legitimizing knowledge and integrating with clients. Even from the examples used, however, this simple model 
was not the whole story. There were limits to any notion of (a) sector knowledge guiding action in some 
unreflective or mechanistic sense, and (b) sector knowledge being ‘‘owned’’ solely by outsiders. 
(a) Knowledge construction in the broader sense has been described by theorists in institutional theory and the so-
called firm-in-sector approach in terms of the interaction between internal and external actors and the networks 
that cross firm boundaries and act as information channels (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001). Some early studies of 
sector evolution tended to argue for convergence and for the alignment of firm-level competencies with structural 
constraints (Abernathy, 1978; Whipp & Clark, 1986). However, others emphasized the uncertainties of emerging 
sector recipes and the need for a path between ‘‘sector determinism and unconstrained volition’’ (Child & Smith, 
1987: p. 371). So while managers seek to understand their world in terms of institutionally shared constructs, 
there is also ‘‘active learning’’ from competitors and rivals, and from intermediaries and networks that traverse 
the sector. This implies a negotiated understanding of what the sector means to different actors and no simple 
transmission of ‘‘recipes’’ or assimilation in organizations (Fincham, Fleck, Procter, Scarbrough, Tierney, & 
Williams, 1994). 
The key issue is the process by which people share or dispute a view of what knowledge of the sector 
means, and what is deemed relevant and irrelevant. The case extracts above, for example, showed 
sequences that reflected a pragmatic internal view. 
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Given that you all work from the same statutory basis, why is it that there’s a selection of approaches? Why can’t 
they be the same? But there are different approaches, different routes you have to go through, different wheels 
that you have to turn. That’s just internally, then there’s the statutory stuff. (Client B) 
There were constraints on the ultimate relevance of outside knowledge and sector knowledge almost 
paradoxically was being used to prove the sector was no infallible guide. Client managers insisted on a boundary 
between firm and sector, while the organization was a practice that outside groups failed to fully penetrate. 
I think consultants don’t always quite pick up the vibe as to what the local cultural issues are sometimes. 
Often the solutions are very good but it’s often the little subtleties about how we operate as opposed to the 
other... even though it’s other boroughs, you think we’re all the same but actually we’re not. (Client C) 
Thus, in terms of the rationales and information that actors used as guides, ‘‘the sector’’ represented a field where 
perceptions and decisions were shaped but without any crude trends towards sameness. This way of 
conceptualizing the firm–sector relationship reflected a level of differentiation. The existence of even quite small 
differences in organizations and sectors caused decision makers to respond in ways that did not ape market and 
technology leaders. Differences were sustained and replenished and decision making was about reading the 
actions of other players. Managers may seek information on authoritative models, and use it to inform and justify 
actions of their own, but they took on board differences that could lead to divergent strategic responses (see also 
Hislop, 2002). 
(b) Attendant on this view of complex knowledge was the fact that insiders too possessed outside knowledge. The 
consultant may claim an ability to fuse local/specific knowledge with generic skills or market savvy, but the 
boundaries between insider and outsider, and between inside knowledge and outside knowledge, were 
complicated and variable. While outside experts ‘‘know the industry via their experience of a clustered group of 
clients, insiders have other forms of access. Local authority managers’ knowledge of their own operations was 
industry knowledge, and an element of sector knowledge, and they also knew their own industry peers. 
Networking was relatively intensive and other authorities going through procurement exercises were freely 
discussed. Council officers had good collegial contacts, and though personal relations were not common, contacts 
such as visits to other councils happened frequently. Clients’ sector knowledge was used actively in finding 
solutions. 
I knew what other local authorities were doing in terms of big master vendor arrangements. I visited 
[names an authority] where it was mentioned, and I visited [names another authority] and one or two 
others to see what they’d been up to because I’d been saying, ‘Look, we could do this quite easily 
ourselves.’ But obviously I’d been saying to them, ‘It’s a big project that needs proper resourcing both 
from the tendering process and then the actual implementation.’ (Client C) 
These differential claims on knowledge found expression in conflict and power imbalances as client and 
consultant groups attempted to construct working relations. The client-consultant couple we have stressed is an 
example of a boundary-spanning relationship, but there are constraints not necessarily overcome by joint learning 
or mutual understanding. In the implicit or explicit contract on which the relationship was built, the possibility 
persisted of conflict between fractions of sector knowledge. Groups differentially valued their own access to the 
sector and might be suspicious of what they perceived as encroachment. Abrasive relations were in evidence on 
the client side in particular; the belief was that consultants brought in conventional business skills whereas 
because of the special nature of local government they, the client, possessed privileged and valuable sector know-
how. 
Under the normal project you’ve employed them [consultants] because you haven’t got that expertise, and 
therefore because of your knowledge gap you’re sort of the weaker partner. And that wasn’t quite the case 
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on this one. We sort of started off with areas of equal knowledge, and on areas of public procurement we 
had more knowledge. I’d say it was 50/50 but there were certainly elements of that about the structure of 
procurement within a local authority which was to their business advantage. (Client B) 
Tensions in the relationship (based initially on convictions that the project could have been handled very well 
internally) led to talking up the knowledge of internal managers and disparaging that of the consultants. There 
were underlying currents in which the senior officer (Client A) in particular was highly supportive of his staff and 
combative towards the consultants, criticizing them as ‘‘almost bystanders’’ in terms of their sector know-how in 
relation to internal staff. 
There seemed to be lots of information that (Client B, his colleague) held which was very—you could see 
their eyes lighting up about where we are with some of the area-wide contracts and having levels of 
information that (Client B) had which would clearly have potential commercial value or interest certainly 
to them. So a lot of that… OK it was quite. . .to me it was kind of quite surprising. I was sensing that they 
would have more things to say. For example, they would say ‘Yes, well, (names a local authority) have 
done this, therefore. . .’ In this respect [I was expecting] much more of an active input. (Client A) 
In short, the claim to intensive sector knowledge—basically that consultants had developed a powerful, local 
government-specific model of e.procurement—was contested. This takes us full circle to the issue of legitimizing 
consultant knowledge, and to the other side of this particular coin. Client managers did feel that they had gained 
valuable data and a ‘‘rigor behind the analysis’’ that they would have struggled for themselves—but 
simultaneously the suggestion that consultants gained from working with clients like themselves was put forward 
to challenge legitimacy. Sector knowledge as a category is thus built of elements that are managed and traded 
differentially in the client–consultant relationship. Some elements may be protected or blocked, in contrast to the 
free sharing of other kinds of sector information. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Placing ‘‘knowledge’’ at the heart of expert groups identifies some widely differentiated occupations. Different 
kinds of expert labor include familiar forms like the powerful professions and technical/design occupations that 
command ‘‘strong’’ knowledge. Groups such as management consultants, on the other hand, are often linked with 
‘‘weak’’ knowledge, esoteric skills, and persuasive devices. However, even the so-called weak knowledge may 
contain structures that are the basis of longer term appeal to clients, and that have perhaps not received the 
attention they deserve. This paper put forward such an example of consultant knowledge, namely expertise that 
helps client firms negotiate their sector. In studying this, the use of a single case study obviously limited 
generality—for example, the meaning of sector knowledge across different sectors, or how it might carry between 
sectors (how knowledge gained on one sector might benefit clients in another). In the most straightforward sense 
this category of knowledge meant knowing actors and actions in the sector, the histories of particular events, and 
claims to have been ‘‘part of’’ (or even to have orchestrated) changes. 
While we have wanted to highlight sector knowledge, we are not saying it is only because of a mastery of this 
type of knowledge that consultants become legitimate in the eyes of clients—clearly there is an issue around the 
relevance of this category of knowledge and the role it plays in comparison with other forms of knowledge 
associated with consultancy. Is it a major source of legitimacy for a consultant, or is its role, for example, more of 
a ‘‘facilitator’’ for other knowledge types? Certainly a number of knowledge types and sources of recognition 
were in play in the case example. Our example was of ‘‘big firm’’ consultancy and legitimacy did not only derive 
solely from the sector experience of consultants, but also from this kind of prestigious practice. The consultants 
brought to the table particular techniques (methodologies and databases) that were proprietary to the firm, and 
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fused them with professional know-how from the field of procurement (Consultant A in particular saw himself as 
a ‘‘procurement professional’’). Reputation and recognition of these methods and approaches to problems was 
evident and we saw how client managers acknowledged the ‘‘rigor’’ of the consultants’ work and in varying 
degrees the substitution of their own labor. The capacity to supply solutions that were generic and spanned several 
sectors was a large part of client appeal.  
That said, it may be an artificial choice between the sector as a category that defines a form of knowledge, or 
instead that helps in mobilizing other sorts of knowledge (much as it is difficult to disentangle categories of tacit 
and explicit knowledge). Knowledge work in general is rarely about either purely technical expertise or about 
skills of persuasion alone. In this fluid and uncertain world, solving problems and constructing solutions is no less 
important than the ability to manage relations with powerful groups (Alvesson, 2004; McKinlay, 2004). Sector 
knowledge in one sense is only the ability to navigate around a group of actors. It is always going to be transient 
in relation to disciplines and professions, and anyone who trades off it needs to be adaptable and flexible (as we 
know consultants are). Nevertheless, sectors were coherent assemblages of contacts and industry languages, and 
the industry peer group was a significant reference point.  
In a sense, this emphasis goes back to the basic ‘‘relational’’ character of consulting work—work that is not 
particularly opaque to the client, and that deals often with powerful client groups. Such a context necessitates 
establishing working relationships, which almost invariably means that a culture and common set of experiences 
has to exist. Expertise built up as shared sector knowledge represented a common set of people and events to talk 
about. In this sense, being able to draw on sector experience was essential for clients and consultants to 
convincingly ‘‘take their place’’ in the decision-making discourse. The possession of this knowledge could almost 
be seen as the stake that allowed actors into the game. The fact of sector knowledge being often fragmentary and 
partial in a sense only underlined that their place had been legitimized. 
The theoretical lenses used in the analysis were linked by a consistent view of the legitimation of sector 
knowledge. Abbott’s (1988) analysis provided a useful perspective on the stages of using and legitimatizing 
knowledge. Nevertheless, it needed adapting since the modes of expert conduct of powerful professions (his main 
focus) differ from those of a group like consultants, and in this respect our conceptual contribution may be 
considered an advance on Abbott. Applied to consultants’ sector knowledge we saw that consultants have to face 
two ways. Orientation to a knowledge base helps in claiming ownership of problems through an initial diagnosis. 
But (lacking a monopoly of knowledge) they need a language in common with the client. Here Carlile’s (2002) 
framework used in conjunction with Abbott’s suggested a shared syntax partly provided by knowledge of the 
sector in which the client firm resides. The example of client–consultant interaction is a classic boundary-
spanning relationship and the sector was utilized within it as a decision-making resource. The stages of building 
towards a solution involved the exchange of sector information, or knowledge sharing, which built legitimacy, 
integrated client and consultant interests and shaped a solution. 
On another level, though, ‘‘sector knowledge’’ could be considered as complex knowledge. This had related 
implications: that sectors as negotiated spaces were not simple forces of outside influence, and that outside 
knowledge was also held by insider groups. Such a view would moderate ‘‘institutional’’ arguments that put 
greatest emphasis on outside influences. For instance, links between the realm of consulting and that of 
management fashion have produced models of demand for consultant services; under conditions of uncertainty a 
tendency to copy practices and fear of losing ground in a given sector is one of the main factors behind the appeal 
of imported solutions (e.g., Kieser, 2002b). We observed rather that sector know-how was actively negotiated 
across boundaries and that it preserved differences between decision-making settings. Certainly, in the local 
authority case, networking sustained the sector as a group of peers and a powerful reference for managers and 
consultants, and it sustained negotiation around institutional knowledge (‘‘recipes’’). But sector knowledge 
provided no technical fix of any kind. While sectors transmitted some industry recipes into firms via consultants, 
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these were negotiated networks. Knowledge localized in pragmatic solutions was something that parties found 
easy to defend, while knowledge held by clients (e.g., privileged knowledge of industry peers) was a key 
component in negotiation. Internal managers had plenty of sector knowledge and our study refuted any simple 
model of consultants as knowledge intermediaries. 
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